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BOOK REVIEWS
EQUITY AND THE Imw. By Louis A. Warsoff. Liveright Publish-
Ing Company, New York. Pp. i-x, 1-324. 1938. $3.00.
At a time when intolerance seems to be increasing, legal provi-
sions for equality will assume importance. Professor Warsoff senses
a need but fails to rise to the occasion by rehashing materials which
are given as well if not better in almost any of the treatises upon
American constitutional history.
The first part of Warsoff's book is not first-rate original research
being based mainly on brief generalizations and quotations from a
few leading decisions. Without inquiring into the more specific ante-
cedents of the equal protection clause, Warsoff derives the idea of
equality from the English law of the land provision of Magna Carta
(1215), Coke's misguided dictate that the law of the land meant due
process, America's extension to legislative as well as executive and
judicial powers, Justice Chase's restriction to natural justice and the
realization that due process was not just protection but a specific
restriction on partial legislation as well. Warsoff tells how Congress,
seemingly oblivious to the due process background of equal protection,
solidified itself with the South by adoption of the conquered provinces
theory in opposition to President Johnson's policy of moderation. Be-
sides attempted elevation of the Negro to terms of parity with the
white man, the radical Congressional group headed by Stevens decided
to punish the South, preserve the Republican Party, and hold Presi-
dent Johnson in line. Failing to pass the Freedman's Bureau Bill by
a two-thirds majority and fearful of a subsequent Democratic Congress
repealing the Civil Rights Bill, a Reconstruction Committee drafted
the Fourteenth Amendment. In conferring personal rights upon the
Negro, Congress showed little concern over Indian and Chinese cover-
age of the Amendment although discrimination among classes of white
men was deliberated. Nothing was said regarding corporations.
In part two, Warsoff accounts for the confusion of the due process
and equal protection clauses by the carry-over of the lump concept
thinking of the pre-Civil War days and the fear of encountering a too
great rigidity. In suggesting the following distinctions: (1) substan-
tively due process is only a minimum, whereas equal protection is a
specific guarantee of something (reasonableness) even though all
members of a class enjoy due process; (2) mechanically equal pro-
tection is (a) not limited to life, liberty, or property, (b) not extended
to protection of interests outside of a state's jurisdiction as is the due
process clause, the author assumes the role of interpreter.
In the formative stages of equal protection, the desire to make the
federal government supreme over the states was manifest as well as
the desire to force the South to accept the Negro as its equal. The
Supreme Court avoided the radicalism of some of the Northern leaders,
and while protecting the Negro on such matters as schools, juror
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service, and administration of statutes, faced what Warsoff terms reali-
ties in upholding heavier penalties for sex crimes.
In the late 80's the legislative freedom of the states was hemmed
in by a departure from the Slaughter House cases upholding the theory
of a limited central authority. Large scale business sought to stop
state restrictive legislation. Corporations came to receive the same
protection as natural persons. A spirit of commercial expansion
replaced the emphasis upon states rights. Also evident was the
necessity of fitting equal protection into an expanded concept of due
process. Some "sore thumb" decisions caused the period to be branded
a judicial reign of terror. The courts were charged with legalism so
that some yardstick of social legislation was sorely needed. In general,
legislatures came to lose their sense of responsibility. Mechanical rea-
soning was adopted by the state courts.
From 1908-17, Warsoff concludes, the court's expanded outlook on
social legislation was transmitted to a new technique of examining
practically into the question of what was "reasonable necessity"
instead of depending on legalistic and mechanical thinking. Legisla-
tive transgression beyond a certainty was the technique applied to
the old tests.
With the close of the World War, the courts fell back into legalism,
distinguishing persons sui juris and non sui jur s similar to the vogue
of 1890-1910. From 1926-30, the personnel of the Supreme Court
changed so that a liberal trend emerged again. During 1933-37, the
author cursorily treats the chain store tax cases, minimum wages for
women, tax assessments, state unemployment acts, and Negro jurors.
In conclusion, the late Justice Holmes is quoted that the analogy of
criminal presumption of innocence is applicable to discrimination.
A mere possibility of difference in opinion should be insufficient to
oust legislation. The clearest showing of law not being reasonably
directed toward its legitimate end should be required.
The author would have done well to have considered the question
when equality is abused. As a matter of fact equality is discrimina-
tion, but the author not having realized the fact allows many errors
of substantive judgment to be made. Amateurish dramatics such as
the skit on Lincoln's death, disjointed and irrelevant pen-portraits of
the Reconstruction leaders, inaccuracies of historical and legal fact
(e.g., some questioned the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Bill as
well as being fearful of subsequent repeal. Due process was more than
little argued in the Slaughter House Cases'), slighting of tax cases,
and loose treatment of the conspiracy theory of corporations to obtain
coverage mar what otherwise might have been a clear account of the
cases'in a socio-economic background. There is no comparison of the
same interests who get protection under limitations in state constitu-
tions under the provisions on special and local legislation, or under
separation of powers, or under the commerce clause, public purpose
in expenditures or exercise of power of eminent domain. The author
-'Cf. Hamilton, The Constitution Reconsidered (1938) XI, p. 166 ff.
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further handicapped the work by the lack of an index, a classified table
pf cases either logically or chronologically, and uniformity in citation
style.
ORsA F. TRAYLOR
Bureau of Business Research
University of Kentucky
HANDBOOx OF INTERN'ATIoNAL Liw (3rd ed.). By George Grafton
Wilson. St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1939. Pp. xxiv, 623.
This number of the Hornbook Series, first published in 1910, now
appears In a third edition. The fact that the book appears in a third
edition is strong indication of its usefulness.
In organization and treatment the treatise is along traditional
lines. The usual subjects are covered and the distribution of space
is about the same as in the general run of textbooks. To many the
amount of space given to the treatment of the rules of war, nearly
half of the book, will seem disproportionate. However, notwithstafd-
ing the large amount of space allotted to war and neutrality, the new
American neutrality legislation is not even as much as mentioned.
While the new United States Neutrality Act does not of course change
international law, it nevertheless represents a new conception of
neutrality, a new policy within the old framework of international
law, and a new departure which may profoundly influence the future
development of the laws of war and neutrality.
The allotment of so much space to the treatment of war and
neutrality means that the rules of the law of peace receive only brief
discussion, with the result that the latter receive only the barest
statement. This deficiency is partly made up by the great amount of
material carried in the footnotes. It raises the question whether a
satisfactory treatise on international law, even a handbook, can any
longer be successfully comprised within the limits set by 'the present
volume.
A. V.&iwmmoson
JunrSDICTION AND PRACTICE OF TH COURTS OF THE UNITE STATES.
(1939 4th ed.) Charles Bunn. West Publishing Company. St. Paul,
Minnesota. Pp. i-ix, 1-257.
Federal jurisdiction and procedure is too large an order to handle
In a summary and completely accurate manner. Professor Bunn with-
out apologies presents with clearness and brevity a carefully prepared
outline of the fundamental principles. His past experience as practi-
tioner and general counsel in the Northwest qualifies him to speak
broadly. The manual, however, is not profound nor is there original
discussion. This revision of the third edition (1927) will be useful
primarily to the beginning student who needs to be told a few of the
facts of jurisdiction and procedure before launching into a more
specific study. For example the essentials of district court jurisdiction,
process, venue, concurrent jurisdiction, three judge district courts,
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government intervener, removals, the original and appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Circuit Courts of Appeals, the conditions of the Supreme
Court's exclusive, original, and appellate jurisdiction including
certiorari and certification, the cases appealed directly, etc.-all these
should be the common knowledge of every student, professor and
practioner. Study of the statutes will be necessary except for those
constantly working in the federal courts.
OxA F. TRA.non
Bureau of Business Research
University of Kentucky
CASES Ox Mo0TGAGES, Second Edition. By Morton C. Campbell.
St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1939. Pp. xxii, 794.
Professor Campbell's excuse for publishing a second edition of his
Cases on Mortgages is that recent developments in the law of mortgages
of real property make a new edition desirable. Specifically the develop-
meats to which Professor Campbell refers relate to mortgages for
future advances, to mortgages of income, to seizure of income through
receiverships, and to competition between mortgages of realty and
liens on attached chattels.' One could hardly disagree with his con-
clusion that such topics deserve special attention and are of particular
importance, especially in connection with corporate mortgages. Yet
when one looks at the cases and material dealing with those topics,
he is impressed not with their adequacy but with their absence, for
there is an extreme lack of material relating to the above subjects, and
that which is included is not particularly recent, only one case having
been decided since 1930. However, Professor Campbell supplied his
answer to the last criticism when he stated in his preface that "The
editor's choice of cases . . . has been governed by quality rather than
modernity. ' 2 And in general one may well agree with him on that
point. But that raises the whole question of the purpose and function
of a casebook and the need for a second edition.
Obviously the primary function of a casebook is as a teaching
tool, a device for training lawyers. And as a method of instruction the
case-system has won its place not because it is better able to impart
information to the student but because it develops a better understand-
ing and mastery of the technique of handling cases. Each case must,
therefore, be chosen with regard to the extent to which the opinion
indicates the technique which lawyers and judges use in arguing and
deciding controversies, as well as to the amount of information it con-
tains regarding the rules, principles, and standards of the law on the
particular point involved. In choosing cases to serve this dual pur-
pose it may be that older cases meet the requirements better than the
more recent ones. This is especially true in subjects in which the law
Is most completely developed, for then the late cases tend to be merely
perfunctory applications of the established doctrines without any con-
P. viii.
2P. viii.
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sideration of their history or the social, political, and economic
philosophy which shaped them. However, it must be remembered that
we in this country have developed, and are at the present develop-
Ing, our own law, so that a modern casebook which contained such a
large percentage of English cases as was found in the early books
would not give the student the proper perspective and would not be a
satisfactory teaching tool. Furthermore, many of the old cases involve
factual situations which are now obsolete and foreign to a modern
student's understanding; cases of that type no longer deserve a place
In our casebooks except in so far as they are included to illustrate the
historical development of the law. Thus the ideal casebook should
represent a balance between cases which are informational in char-
acter and those which primarily develop technique and understanding,
between cases which give an historical perspective and those which
present modern problems. In that way both knowledge and under-
standing can be developed, and the relation between the social, political,
and economic philosophy of the day and the rules, principles, and
standards of the law can be appreciated. Once such a casebook is
compiled it should remain a good teaching tool until the doctrines of
the law are changed or until a new philosophy requires a different
approach to the old problems.
Tested by these standards one may well question the recent tend-
ency to publish new casebooks and new editions of old casebooks
every few years. Certainly the rules, principles, and standards of
the law, with the possible exception of the field of public law, do
not change so quickly; and this writer doubts whether many of the
new editions really represent a new approach, a changed philosophy.3
In this respect Professor Campbell exercised more restraint than most
compilers of casebooks for he waited fourteen years before bringing
out his second edition, and even after such a lengthy period less than
fourteen per cent of the cases in the new volume have been decided
since the first edition was published.
With the exception of the inclusion of problem questions following
each case, the organization of the material and the manner of pres-
entation is entirely orthodox. Professor Campbell seems convinced
of the usefulness of such questions, but others, including the writer,
would disagree with him. Granted that the use of hypothetical ques-
tions has proved advantageous in the classroom, there seems no reason
why the compiler of a casebook intended for general use should
include in the book the particular questions which he uses in class,
any more than he should include his other lecture notes. The use of
such questions is better left to each instructor, and the inclusion of
30ne suspects that perhaps the exigencies of the publishing busi-
ness may account for some of the books.
'Compare the first and second editions of Jacobs' Cases and
Materials on Domestic Relations, particularly the statements in the
prefaces in which Professor Jacobs indicates a definite abandonment
of problem questions; see also a review of Professor Campbell's book
In 49 Yale Law Journal 372 in which Professor Wormser questions the
use of such material.
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questions in the casebook itself tends to force the instructor to use
such questions and thus to determine his approach to the problems.
In other respects the book very well measures up to the standard
of a good casebook. It contains a well arranged selection of cases
which are capable of serving the dual function of supplying a knowl-
-edge of the rules, principles, and standards relating to the law of
mortgages and of developing an understanding of the technique
which lawyers and judges use in dealing with mortgage problems.
LAUnuMOM M. ToNWe
Professor of Law
Emory University
